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et al.: Constitutional Limitations

NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Bowers v. Hardwick'
The Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick defined one parameter of
the right to privacy. This amorphous concept is rooted in personal activities
relating to accepted family relationships. Factors affecting marriage, procreation, and control of reproductive functions are considered so fundamen3
tal to the individual that a state's attempts to limit them are unconstitutional.
Although other courts have attempted to extend the right to privacy to
include intimate associations 4 many courts were unsure of the degree of
constitutional protection to be given to activities such as sodomy. The Supreme Court has halted the expansion of the right to privacy, holding that
intimate associations in the act of sodomy are not afforded constitutional pro5
tection.
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bowers v. Hardwick had held that laws prohibiting adult consensual sodomy could not stand
in the face of constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law and
of privacy. 6 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in Bowers,
holding that there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy, and that
laws making such conduct a crime are valid. 7
The basis for challenging the law was the arrest of Michael Hardwick
on August 3, 1982. Hardwick was charged with committing the crime of
sodomy with a consenting adult of the same sex in his home. 8 Following a
1. 106 S. Ct. 2841, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
2. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (contraceptives).
4. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1980); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Commonwealth
v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
5. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
-6. 760 F.2d at 1212.
7. 106 S.Ct. at 2846.
8. 760 F.2d at 1204.
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hearing and a decision to dismiss the case, 9 Hardwick filed suit naming
Michael Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia; Lewis Slaton, District Attorney for Fulton County; and George Napper, Public Safety Commissioner
of Atlanta, as defendants. Hardwick alleged that the Georgia sodomy statute
was unconstitutional.10 John and Mary Doe, a married couple, attempted to
join Hardwick in his suit. They claimed that they had been "chilled and
deterred"" from engaging in the statute's proscribed activity.
The trial court granted all three defendants' motions to dismiss the
constitutional claim for failure to state a cause of action.' 2 The Does were
found to lack standing because they had never been arrested in violation of
the statute and had presented no evidence that the possibility of arrest was
a legitimate threat."3 Hardwick's claim was dismissed based on the Supreme
4
Court's summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth.1
Following an appeal by all three plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the Georgia sodomy statute violated fundamental
constitutional rights. 5The court noted, "The Constitution prevents the states
from unduly interfering in certain individual decisions crucial to personal
autonomy because those decision are essentially private and beyond the legitimate reach of civilized society."' 6 While finding that the Does lacked
standing, 7 the court reached the merits of the case through Hardwick's claim.
The case was remanded for a showing by the state that there was a compelling
interest in the regulation of this type of behavior.' 8
9. Id. Following the arrest, the District Attorney's office declined to pursue
the case to the grand jury without additional evidence. Hardwick filed his suit contending that he was a practicing homosexual who had in the past and would continue
to engage in the acts prohibited by the sodomy statute, and as such had standing to
challenge its constitutionality.
10, Id.
11. Id.
12, Id.
13, Id. at 1204, 1206-07.
14. For a discussion of the summary affirmance aspect of this case, see Note,
Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. Mian L. REv. 973 (1985). The plaintiffs in Doe,

homosexuals who had never been arrested, attempted to invalidate a sodomy statute
which they claimed violated their rights of privacy and freedom of expression. The
district court found the statute constitutionally valid and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment. The decision was based on the lack of standing of the
plaintiffs to bring the claim, but the Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal on the
merits in the lower court instead of vacating the judgment. This case was read narrowly by the Eleventh Circuit in Bowers, which found that the case need not be
dismissed since a different standing question was at issue. Bowers v. Hardwick, 760
F.2d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S.
Ct. 29 (1986).
15. 760 F.2d at 1211.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1207.
18. Id. at 1213. A discussion of the case at this point and a comprehensive
study of related sodomy laws can be found in Survey on the ConstitutionalRight to
Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAm L. RFv. 521 (1986).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and on June 30, 1986, reversed
the decision of the court of appeals.' 9 In its analysis, the Court separated
the desirability of prohibiting sodomy by consenting adults and a constitutional right to engage in such conduct. The court acknowledged prior cases
providing constitutional support for Hardwick's claim in the areas of family
relationships," marriage, 2' contraception, 22 procreation, 23 and abortion. 24 Distinguishing these activities from the activity in this case,2625 the Court found
no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
The concept of fundamental right is important in the analysis of any
due process violation. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution disallow actions by the government which would "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."127 This
acts as a safeguard limiting governmental restrictions on certain freedoms.
Substantive due process, distinguished from procedural due process, "may
protect certain fundamental rights or void arbitrary limitations on a person's
freedom of action." '28 Through incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the states
are also prohibited from enacting legislation which would deny such guarantees as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 29 Few would dispute
that such personal freedoms do exist and that their protection is a vital
purpose of the Constitution. Controversy arises when courts attempt to define
the parameters of substantive due process beyond the vague "life, liberty,
and property." These fundamental rights could be as broad as the right of
an individual to be left alone if not harming another, or as narrow as the
rule of the majority's morals at the moment in question.
A fundamental right flowing from the marriage relationship was articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut 0 Griswold involved a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal act. Taking into consideration past cases which broadened the specific liberties protected by the Bill
19. 106 S. Ct. at 2847.
20. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. The Court discussed the past cases of right to privacy claims, finding that
all of these areas (family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception and
abortion) were those which could be traced to traditional ideas of the family and
marriage. They represented that which had always been held sacred in our society.
Conduct which has been labeled sodomy, with its past history of societal disapproval,
could not fall within this narrow characterization of a "fundamental right." 106 S.
Ct. at 2844.
26. Id.

§ 1.

27.

U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

28.

J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrTToNAL LAW 452 (3d ed.

29.

Id.

1986).
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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3
of Rights, ' the Supreme Court found that the case concerned "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
32
guarantees."
A law which dealt with the use, not the sale or manufacture, of- contraceptives was seen as too great an interference with "a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our
school system," 33 - the association of two people in marriage. This governmental intrusion would not be allowed because it invaded a private and
socially acceptable relationship, the act of sexual intercourse between two
legally married individuals. The Supreme Court also raised the difficulty of
implementing the law, stating, "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
' 34
the marriage relationship.
35
The evolution of the right to privacy continued in Stanley v. Georgia,
where the appellant claimed that a Georgia statute prohibiting possession of
obscene material was unconstitutional. In Stanley, the police found obscene
films in Stanley's bedroom and he was convicted of knowingly possessing
obscene material. 36 The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Georgia.3 The United States Supreme Court found that the first and fourteenth amendments would invalidate a statute making criminal the private
possession of obscene materials,38 and stated, "Also fundamental is the right
31. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to educate
one's children); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (the freedom to
distribute, receive and read literature); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
(loyalty oath as a pre-condition to employment); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association).
32. 381 U.S. at 485. The concept of "zones of privacy" had its genesis in
other constitutional guarantees such as the right of association and the third amendment, which would prohibit quartering of soldiers in a house during times of peace
without the owner's permission.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Id. at 484.
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id. at 485-86.
35. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
36. Id. at 558-59.
37. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
38. The first amendment has not been used to give blanket protection to
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to be free except in very limited circumstances from unvanted governmental
intrusion into one's privacy." 3 9
Distinguishing the possession of obscene materials from prohibitions on
the possession of narcotics, firearms or stolen goods, the Court found that
appellant was "asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases - the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home." 4 The Court emphasized, however, that in cases involving national
security, the compelling state interest would be sufficient to reach into the
home despite the guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments. 4'
The Supreme Court again used the family as a basis for the right to
privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird.42 In that case, a lecturer was convicted of
showing contraceptives and of giving away a package of vaginal foam to
students at Boston University.43 Massachusetts law provided for a maximum
of five years in prison for anyone who gave away any device for the prevention of pregnancy. 44 An exception existed only for a physician or pharmacist who could provide contraceptives to married persons. 45 Thus, married
people could only get contraceptives from a doctor or pharmacist, while
single people could not obtain them at all. Both groups, however, could get
contraceptives from a doctor or pharmacist to prevent disease. 46
The Court found that the state's interest in prohibiting premarital sexual
intercourse was not being furthered by these statutes. 47 For single people, the
obscenity. There is even a question as to whether the first amendment gives any
protection at all to what has been deemed to be pornography. See generally Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1947); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146, 158 (1945); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1941). According
to the Stanley Court, the state has an interest in dealing with obscenity and thus
could enact laws to control its distribution. However, the Court would not allow the
exercise of this interest to prohibit the private possession of it, stating:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
Stanley v.State, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
39. Id. at 564.
40. Id.at 565.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 568 n.11.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 440.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1970).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972).

46. Id.at 441-42.
47. The state had argued that the law furthered the goal of protecting health.
The State Supreme Judicial Court stated that the law related to "preventing the
distribution of articles designed to prevent conception which may have undesirable
if not dangerous physical consequences." Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746,
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prohibitions constituted a violation of their rights under the equal protection
clause because no legitimate reason was found for the distinction between
single and married people. 48 The Court found that deterring premarital sex
could be a legitimate concern of the state, but the statute in question did
not accomplish this end.4 9 Acknowledging that the right to privacy evidenced
in Griswold 0 had its roots in marriage, the Court stated, "Yet the marital
couple is not an independent entity with mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup."'" It was these individuals who must be protected by a right of
privacy in "matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. ' 5 2 The holding in Griswoldthat prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptives to married individuals was unconstitutional
would preclude an attempt to prohibit the same activity in single individuals. 5 3
A famous privacy case, Roe v. Wade,54 is generating as much controversy
today as it did when the decision was rendered in 1973. Roe declared that
the right to privacy included a woman's decision to have an abortion.5 5 The
Supreme Court reached this conclusion by balancing a woman's right to
choose against the competing state interests in protecting a woman's health
in the later trimesters of pregnancy and in protecting the life of the fetus.5 6
The due process analysis requires this comparison of competing values. 57
The state had asserted an interest in discouraging "illicit sexual conduct,"
protecting the life of the woman, and protecting the life of the fetus.58 Against
these interests was the woman's right to privacy concerning her own body
and her own procreative decisions. The Court found that the right to privacy
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
753, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1969). The Supreme Court in Eisenstadt, found that this
was not a legitimate protection of health only for single persons. Even an argument
based on moral grounds would fail. The contraceptives were available to married
persons with no restrictions that they be used with their spouse, or even that they be
living with their spouse at the time they received the contraceptives. 405 U.S. at 442.
48. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
49. Id. at 448.
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Id.at 153.
56. Id.at 154.
57. Id.at 155.
58. Id. at 150. The Court noted that when the right asserted was found to be
a fundamental right, an attempt at limitation can only be "justified by a compelling
state interest." Id. at 155. Even with a finding of the sufficient state interest, it would
be necessary to read the legislation narrowly to protect the interest without unduly
infringing upon the right.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/6

6

1987]

RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
et al.: Constitutional
Limitations

determined in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people,
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 9
The Court indicated that this right had limitations; at some point the state's
interests in regulating abortion would become compelling. The state's interest
in discouraging sexual intercourse was discounted, 6° but the other two interests were found to become compelling at the end of the first trimester. 6 The
Court compared this case with those in which states were allowed to limit
an individual's privacy right by requiring vaccination. 62
The right to privacy was being shaped through these cases. A concept
which had begun as a hybrid of other constitutional guarantees was expanding
in its protection of the individual from governmental interference with very
private aspects of life. The above cases had persuaded several courts to extend
the right to privacy. This extension was not based on the family or marriage,
but on the right of the individual to be free in the choice of "intimate
associations." 6
In People v. Onofre,64 the Court of Appeals of New York found that
a law prohibiting consensual sodomy violated the United States Constitution.
In this case two of the appellants, one male and one female, performed oral
sodomy in an automobile. 65 Another appellant admitted to engaging in sodomy with a member of the same sex in his home.6 All were convicted and
subsequently claimed that the statute was unconstitutional. 67
The defendant argued that these situations differed from other public
activities which had been prohibited. 6 The court referred to the activity as
59. Id. at 153. The ninth amendment to the United States Constitution reserves
certain rights to the people even though they might not be specifically mentioned in
the Constitution. Justice Blackmun raised the ninth amendment in his Bowers dissent.
While not elaborating on its implication, he stated that a claim by Hardwick based
on the ninth amendment would not be unreasonable and that the Supreme Court
should not dispose of the case while any constitutional ground existed upon which
Hardwick could find relief. 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973). It was argued that this purpose
was not a proper one for the state to espouse since it did not distinguish in any way
between married and unmarried sexual intercourse. Id.
61. Id. at 163-64.
62. Id. at 154.
63. See cases cited supra note 3.
64. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
65. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
66. Id. at 483, 415 N.E.2d at 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
67. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
68. The court stressed that this activity was one which took place in the home,
stating that there was a distinction between "public dissemination of what might have
been considered inimical to public morality and individual recourse to the same
material out of the public arena and in the sanctum of the private home." Id. at
489, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. Thus other activities such as exhibitionism and conduct which might be considered sodomy when performed in a commercial setting could still be prohibited.
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"noncommercial, cloistered personal sexual conduct of consenting adults," 69
and held that, as such, it was entitled to protection despite the state's claim
that the right to privacy in past cases only applied to personal decisions
involving marriage.70 Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird7 and Stanley v. Georgia,72
the court found that the decisions of adults regarding private sexual intimacy
should be constitutionally protected under the right to privacy. 73
The court next determined whether the state's interest would outweigh
that of the individual's privacy rights if the state had shown justification for
the statute. 74 The court found that the goal of furthering public morality was
not sufficient when it involved an activity out of the public eye and without
commercial gain. This statute would not "advance the cause of public morality or do anything other than restrict individual conduct and impose a
concept of private morality chosen by the State."' 75 The New York court
acknowledged that many people believed sodomy to be an evil, even when
consensual, but that this belief, even if held by the majority, would not
justify criminal sanctions. The United States Constitution did not allow this
activity to be controlled by criminal penalties.76 Without deciding the moral
questions involved in consensual sodomy, the court noted, "The community
and its members are entirely free to employ theological teaching, moral suasion, parental advice, psychological and psychiatric counseling and other
noncoercive means to condemn the practice." 77 These would all be acceptable
alternatives to making the activity a crime.
69. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
70. Id. at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
71. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
72. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
73. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 487-88, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939-40, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 950-51 (1980).
74. This same court had found a sufficient state interest in People v. Shepard,
50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1980). A statute prohibiting
marijuana possession in a person's home was found to be constitutional. It was found
to be such a harmful substance that the state's control of it in the home was warranted.
Id. at 645, 409 N.E.2d at 842, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 365. In Onofre, no evidence was
presented that consensual, private sodomy was harmful. The main point in the state's
attempt to justify controlling the behavior was the past societal disapproval of sodomy. 51 N.Y.2d at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52. The court
stated that it was not to be assumed that just because it was allowed to enter the
person's home to "regulate conduct justifiably found to be harmful to him, the
Legislature may also intrude on such privacy to regulate individual conduct where
no basis has been shown for concluding that the conduct is harmful." 51 N.Y.2d at
491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
75. 51 N.Y.2d at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
76. Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
77. Id. at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3. The court
stated that although it often has that result, the purpose of the Penal Law is not to
force the theological or moral values of the majority upon the minority. This is in
opposition to the established idea of the police powers of the state to regulate health
and morality. Id.
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Three years later, in 1983, the same court decided People v. Uplinger,
a case challenging a statute which prohibited loitering in a public place in
order to engage in or solicit "deviate" sodomy. This case was viewed in the
context of the earlier People v. Onofre decision. Based on Onofre, the court
stated, "Inasmuch as the conduct ultimately contemplated by the loitering
upon which the
statute may not be deemed criminal, we perceive no basis
' 79
State may continue to punish loitering for that purpose.

Another sodomy statute was struck down in Commonwealth v.
Bonadio,80 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed a statute
which prohibited sexual intercourse per mouth or per anus between unmarried
people, and sexual intercourse with animals. 81 The court noted that the exercise of the state's police power was justified in cases of force, sexual abuse
of minors, and cruelty to animals. This statute, however, did nothing to
82
further these goals.
To support its conclusion, the court quoted John Stuart Mill: "There
is a sphere of action in which society as distinguished from the individual
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a
person's life and conduct which affects others, only with their free, voluntary,
and undeceived consent and participation." 83
Two recent cases, Baker v. Wade 4 and Post v. State,85 differed in their
approach to the sodomy statutes in question. Post, decided in February 1986,
a few months before the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
found an Oklahoma statute to be unconstitutional under the facts of the
particular case. 6 The appeal resulted from a conviction on two counts of
the "Crimes Against 8Nature" statute.Y The statute made criminal certain
''unnatural" sex acts. 8 The court found that the right to privacy which "at
first appeared to be family-based, affords protection to the decisions and
actions of individuals outside the marriage union." 89 The court did not consider the issue of homosexuality in this case, but as to heterosexual behavior,
78. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983).
79. Id. at 937, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
80. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
81. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. 3101 (Purdon 1973).
82. 490 Pa. at 92, 415 A.2d at 49.
83. Id. at 97, 415 A.2d at 50 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859)).
84. 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).
85. 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
86. Id. at 1109-10.
87. OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1981). "Every person who is guilty
of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or
with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten
years." Id.
88. The sexual acts viewed as criminal included copulation per os between
females, cunnilingus, and fellatio.
89. 715 P.2d at 1108.
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the court found that the statute invaded individuals' right to privacy. The
court stated, "The right to privacy as formulated by the Supreme Court
includes the right to select consensual adult sex partners." 9
Not all states confronting the issue so extended the right to privacy.
Baker v. Wade,9 a 1985 Texas case, found that a sodomy statute prohibiting
homosexual conduct was constitutional. "We see ourselves bound by the
decision of the lawmakers of Texas ....
The Statute deprives no one of a
constitutional right." 92 There had been no clear mandate that this type of
behavior was constitutionally protected, and the Texas court refused to find
it so. Absent constitutional protection, the court felt bound by the legislature's determination of the rational basis of the law. The court deferred to
the Supreme Court for a determination of a privacy right for this type of
conduct. 93
The Supreme Court denied the existence of this right in Bowers v. Hardwick, decided on June 26, 1986. 9 4 In Bowers the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found the sodomy statutes to be unconstitutional, 95 stating, "Some
personal decisions affect an individual's life so keenly that the right to privacy
prohibits state interferences even though the decision could have significant
public consequences. ' 96 The court found adults' consensual homosexual relationships to be intimate associations which should not be regulated by the
state absent a compelling interest. 97 This decision, which seemed to follow
the trend of past cases to expand the right to privacy to include sexual
behavior, 98 was reversed by the Supreme Court, which returned to a standard
requiring that the behavior in question be a traditional value in order to be
given constitutional protection. 99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because other courts had reached
results differing from that of the Eleventh Circuit.' ° The Court narrowly
defined fundamental liberties to include only those "deeply rooted in this
90. Id. at 1109.
91. 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. Id. at 1287.
93. Id.
94. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
95. Bowers v. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
96. Id. at 1211.
97. Id. at 1213.
98. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy statute relating
to heterosexual oral sex with a person other than one's spouse found to be unconstitutional); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 497
(1980) (statute prohibiting consensual sodomy with person of same sex found to be
unconstitutional).
99. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
100. See Baker v. Wade 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985); Dronenburg v. Zech,
741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir 1984).
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nation's history and tradition," 10' and found that homosexuality, which had
2
been condemned widely in the past, did not fit into this category. 0 Distin03
guishing Stanley, the Court found that not all conduct taking place in the
home is protected from state action, and expressed concern that a decision
to the contrary would open challenges on the laws of incest, adultery and
other sexual crimes.1 4
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens dissented, saying:
This case is no more about a "Fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, . . . than Stanley v. Georgia
... was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v.
United States ... was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets
from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "The most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," namely "the right to
be let alone."'' 5
Justice Blackmun wrote that if the right to privacy was to have any meaning
the legislature must provide a better reason for the statute than that the
prohibited activity is "an abominable crime not fit to be named among
Christians.06'He noted that the majority focused on the homosexual character of the suit while ignoring the broad language of the statute. 0 7 Under
Georgia law, the crime of sodomy is committed when performing any sexual
activity "involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another."'' 0 This definition would certainly encompass heterosexual as well
as homosexual behavior.
Both dissenting opinions focus on the idea that the right to privacy
should be based on personal autonomy. "We protect those rights [family
and marital relationships] not because they contribute, in some direct and
material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central
a part of an individual's life."' 9 The dissent states that the Court denied
101. 106 S. Ct. 2844 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)). These traditional values accepted by the majority include the marriage and
family relationship, and springing from that relationship, the right to decide to bear
children.
102. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The Court noted that laws prohibiting sodomy had
"ancient roots" and that until 1961 all fifty states had such laws. Id. See Note, supra
note 18.
103. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
104. 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
105. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
106. Id. at 2848 (quoting Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721, 46 S.E. 876, 882
(1904)).
107. Id. at 2849.
108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984).
109. 106 S.Ct. at 2851.
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each individual the right to control his "intimate associations with others." 11 0
Justice Stevens, dissenting with Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
joining, stated, "[T]hat the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." ' ' As an example, Justice Stevens
noted that statutes prohibiting miscegenation were found to be unconstitu2
tional even though the traditions of the country found them to be immoral.1
The Supreme Court should have looked at the constitutional question
presented by these sodomy statutes without such regard for the history of
the act proscribed. Today the idea of racial equality is not one which the
majority of people would find offensive or immoral. Such beliefs and ideas
changed, even after decades of teachings that one race was inferior to the
other. There are claims today that the belief exists among the majority that
the homosexual lifestyle is offensive and immoral. Extensive historical background is presented for this proposition,"' yet this history does not make
the idea more sacred or immune from constitutional examination than did
the history of racial segregation. Justice Stevens also stressed the problems
in enforcing this rule. Past cases like Eisenstadt"" and Griswold"' would
indicate that sodomy could not be prohibited in the marital relationship or
even between unmarried heterosexual adults." 6 This presents the problem of
the statute only being applied to homosexuals despite its broad language.
The statute may not even be applied in that capacity since the Georgia
prosecutor initially did not press charges against Hardwick in this case, and
the prohibition against private, consensual sodomy, had not been enforced
in Georgia for some time." 7
The Missouri Supreme Court quickly accepted the Hardwick rationale
to uphold its own sodomy statute in State of Missouri v. Walsh." 8 In several
prior cases the Supreme Court of Missouri had managed to avoid the question
of the constitutionality of its sodomy statute by asserting that the issue was
not raised in a timely fashion." 9
110. Id. at 2852.
111. Id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
113. The majority opinion in Bowers cites thirty-eight states with anti-sodomy
laws; some of which date back to the 1700's. 106 S. Ct. at 2845.
114. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2859.
118. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). This case was decided July 15, 1986, fifteen
days after the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
119. See State of Missouri v. Wickizer, 583 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
State of Missouri v. Collins, 587 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Referring to State
v. Burton, 544 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), the Collins court noted that the
"issue was not raised at the earliest time consistent with good pleading and orderly
procedure and is not preserved for appellate review." 587 S.W.2d at 308.
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The right to privacy issue was addressed in Caesar'sHealth Club v. St.
Louis City,120 concerning a massage parlor in St. Louis County. In that case,
a law prohibiting prostitution was challenged on constitutional grounds.12
The Health Club stated that their employees gave massages which resulted
in the consensual touching of a person's anus or genitals.'2 This activity was
prohibited by the statute, which the appellants claimed interfered with the
right to privacy of their employees and customers.'2
The trial court and the court of appeals held the ordinance constitutional.124 Relying on ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,121 the court distinguished
between activity taking place in the privacy of the home and activity of a
commercial nature. In Paris, the Supreme Court had found that a theater,
a "place of public accommodation," was not protected by the right to privacy. 126 The health club in question in Ceasar'swas, by its public and commercial nature, not one in which the right to privacy issue would emerge.
The court stated that the "commercial aspect" removed the case "from the
sphere of a protectable right of privacy."' 27 The court left open the question
of whether this activity would be protected if not involving prostitution or
a public place.
The Missouri Court of Appeals defended a statute making sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex a criminal offense in L. v. D. ,121
a divorce case in which a homosexual mother sought custody of her two
children. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that morality is a factor,
especially in the case of child custody, and that the trial court had ample
29
evidence to justify awarding the father custody.
In State of Missouri v. Walsh,'" the defendant was charged with attempted sexual misconduct when he touched the genitalia of a police officer
through the latter's clothing. The Missouri Supreme Court relied on Bowers
in holding that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right to
engage in sodomy. The court found that the statute existed to protect and
promote public health and morals.' The court stated that they were not
bound by the decision of Commonwealth v. Bonadio,1 2 which applied the
120. 565 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
121. Id. at 785.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 787.
124. Id. at 785, 788.
125. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
126. Id. at 66.
127. Caesar's Health Club v. St. Louis City, 565 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); see also Brown v. Haner, 410 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Va. 1976).
128. 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
129. Id. at 245.
130.

713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).

131.

Id. at 512.

132.

490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
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principles of autonomy to the right to privacy issue, and used the recent
spread of acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and general promiscuity of a homosexual lifestyle as a rationale for the enforcement of the
statute.' 33 The court reserved the issue of right to privacy under the Missouri
Constitution and relied on the federal decision stating, "the application of
the right of privacy
Missouri's right of privacy to date has not3 paralleled
4
said to inhere in the Federal Constitution."'
The Supreme Court has limited the concept of the constitutional right
to privacy to those rights which appear to be "implicit in the concept of
13
ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'
The right to engage in consensual homosexual conduct is not to be included
in this list of protected activities. Despite the evolution in the right to privacy
area which had expanded the constitutional protection afforded to the individual, the Court has closed the door on protecting that which is most
"private" and should be an individual's "right" - a consensual, intimate
association with another adult.
Anti-sodomy statutes have also been attacked as violating the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 36 The fourteenth amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."' 137 If a law classifies individuals on the
basis of race, alienage or national origin (suspect classifications), the law
must pass a strict scrutiny standard of review. 38 The state must show that
133. 713 S.W.2d at 512. As the percentage of heterosexuals who have Acquired
Immuno-deficiency Syndrome increases, this argument could lose its impact as a
reason to deny homosexuals constitutional protection. Alternatively it could be used
as a device to control the sexual patterns of the heterosexual community as well.
Groups at risk for AIDS include not only homosexuals, but intravenous drug users,
hemophiliacs, and those receiving blood transfusions. Castro, Hardy, & Curran, The
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Epidemiology and Risk Factorsfor Transmission, MED. CLMncs OF N. AM., Vol. 70, No. 3, May 1986, at 635. There is also

evidence that AIDS can be transmitted by heterosexual contact, both male to female
and female to male transmission. Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Wright, Sarngadharan, & Gallo, HeterosexuallyAcquired HTL V-Il1/LA V Disease EpidemiologicEvidence for Female to Male Transmission, J. A.M.A., Vol. 254, No. 15, Oct. 18, 1985,
at 2094; Lederman, Transmission of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
Through Heterosexual Activity, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED., Vol. 104, No. 1,
Jan. 1986, at 115; Goldsmith, More Heterosexual Spread of HTLV-11 Virus Seen,
J. A.M.A., Vol. 253, No. 23, June 21, 1985, at 3377. See Note, supra note 18 at
626-35.
134. 713 S.W.2d at 513.
135. 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
136. See Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985); People v. Onofre, 51
N.Y. 415, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 130 Misc. 2d 893, 497 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1985).
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there is a compelling state interest and that the law in question is narrowly
designed to meet that interest. 3 9 When the law concerns neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification, the state need only show that it
bears "some rational relation to a constitutionally permissible purpose.' ' 40
In Loving v. Virginia,' 4 the Supreme Court evaluated a Virginia statute which
prohibited marriage between persons of different races. A Negro woman and
Caucasian man were married in the District of Columbia and later moved
to Virginia. Following a conviction for interracial marriage, they received a
one year suspended sentence and instructions not to return to Virginia together for twenty-five years. 42 The Lovings moved and filed a motion to
vacate because the statutes violated the fourteenth amendment. 43 The lower
court and Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the statutes, saying
that antimiscegenation statues were constitutional. 44
The United States Supreme Court found these statutes "violated the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."' 4' The Court rejected the
contention that the statutes treated both black and white individuals the same
if they chose to inter-marry, and found that the distinction based on race
was unconstitutional.146 The Court would require "the most rigid scrutiny"' 47
in criminal statutes. To be valid, they "must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective.' ' 48 In addition, the
statute violated the due process clause in that denying the fundamental freedom of marriage "on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.' ' 149 This
freedom to marry was central to the individual and could not be prohibited
or interfered with by the state to this extent.
In Loving, the Court found that it was unconstitutional for the state to
interfere with the marriage relationship on the basis of race. 50 While not
concerning the institution of marriage, the same argument has been made
139. Id.
140. Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivateHomosexual Conduct, 72 MicH. L. REv. 1613, 1623 (1974).
141. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 12 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart found the equal protection clause would prohibit restricting the rights of a person solely because of racial
considerations. Id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 10-11.
147. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
148. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
149. Id. at 12.
150. Id. at 11.
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concerning same sex associations.'15 The states are, in effect, denying the
right of one person to associate with another in a certain manner based solely
on the sex of that person. As a result, sodomy statutes may discriminate
against homosexuals. Statutes prohibiting oral and anal sexual intercourse
do not "close all legal outlets for heterosexual love as they do for homosexual
52
love.'"
The courts have not found homosexuals to be a suspect class for equal
protection purposes, thus such statutes are not required to pass strict scrutiny. In Baker v. Wade,'53 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
no evidence had been presented that homosexuals were a suspect or semisuspect class and thus the standard of review for the sodomy statute was
whether it was rationally related to a state goal. 54 If the class in question
were found to be suspect, the laws would undergo strict scrutiny by the court
and be required to meet a specific, compelling state interest.' 55 On petition
for rehearing in this case, the court denied the plaintiffs equal protection
argument on the grounds that the statute was directed at "certain conduct
not at a class of people. Though the conduct be the desire of the bisexually
or homosexually inclined, there is no necessity that they engage in it. The
statute affects only those who chose to act in the manner proscribed."' 56 In
Bowers v. Hardwick,'57 Justice Blackmun's dissent raises questions of an
equal protection nature even though Hardwick did not raise the issue. Justice
Blackmun states that the decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed
if any ground exists that would give relief to the respondent. 58 In addition
to the right to privacy grounds, Justice Stevens also saw merit in arguments
that the statute violated the eighth amendment'5 9 and the equal protection
clause.16'
Two cases which found that the equal protection clause would invalidate
a sodomy statute were Commonwealth v. Bonadio'6' and People v. Onofre.162
151. See supra note 133.
152. Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivateHomosexual Conduct, 72 MicH L. REv. 1613, 1623 (1974).
153. 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).
154. Id. at 292.
155. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 130 Misc. 2d 893, 497 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1985).
156. Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985).
157. 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986).
158. 106 S.Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The "homosexual orientation may well form part of the very fiber of an individual's personality."
106 S. Ct. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962), for the proposition that it was
unconstitutional to convict a defendant because of his "status" as a narcotics addict).
160. 106 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
162. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
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The Bonadio court found that the statute which made a particular sexual
behavior illegal between persons who were not husband and wife was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
Not only does the statute in question exceed the proper bounds of the police
power, but, in addition, it offends the Constitution by creating a classification based on marital status (making deviate acts criminal only when
performed between unmarried persons) where such differential treatment is
not supported by a sufficient state interest and thereby denies equal protec36
tion of the laws."
Even without finding that a fundamental right (such as the right to privacy)
was involved or that the classification was suspect, the equal protection clause
would require a showing that the classification was rationally related to that
which the statute was attempting to accomplish. 64 In this case, the state
claimed that the justification for this statute was protecting the privacy of
the marital relationship. The court discounted this, finding that the statute
did not fulfill this objective. 6 In People v. Onofre,'66 the Court of Appeals of New York found that
the state had failed in its burden to show that there was any rational basis
for treating married and unmarried people differently. 67 In Missouri, the
Supreme Court struck down the equal protection argument in State of Missouri v. Walsh. 6 The respondent argued that an improper class distinction
existed in the sodomy statutes because it prohibited men from engaging in
sexual activity with other men, while not prohibiting women from doing the
same. The state found that this argument was invalid by viewing the statute
as prohibiting both men and women from performing these activities with
69
members of their own sex.
The court found that the statute in question did not specifically make
it a crime to be a homosexual, but only to engage in the homosexual conduct. 170 Yet this still prohibited the homosexual person from activity that was
not prohibited to the heterosexual, and as such was a "classification based
upon sexual preference."''
The court denied that homosexuals constituted a group to be considered
"suspect," such as race, national origin, and alienage, discounting the idea
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

490 Pa. at 98, 415 A.2d at 51.
Id.
Id.
51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
Id. at 482, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.

168.

713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).

169. Id. at 510.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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that the homosexual orientation is beyond the individual's control.' 72 Even
if that were the case, the court found that by prohibiting the conduct, not
the characteristic, the statute was valid.' 71 "It cannot be said in the usual
circumstance that refraining from certain conduct is beyond control. Beyond
prohibiting the specific conduct, the statute imposes no other burden."' 7 4
Responding to the claim that this legislation of private consensual conduct was beyond the scope of the legitimate state interest, the court defended
the state's interest in promoting morality. The court, quoting Dronenburg
v. Zech,'7 1 stated,
[Respondent's] theory would, in fact, destroy the basis for much of the most
valued legislation our society has. It would, for example, render legislation
about civil rights, worker safety, the preservation of the environment, and
much more unconstitutional. In each of these areas, legislative76 majorities
have made moral choices contrary to the desires of minorities.'
The court equates legislation concerning worker safety with legislation which
polices individuals' bedrooms. Both of these may indeed have as their basis
a moral fiber, but the cost to individual liberty which should be constitutionally protected is quite different.
Homosexuals are not considered a suspect class under equal protection
laws and thus are not entitled to the more stringent standard for review of
laws which purport to discriminate against them. Despite strong parallels
between equal protection cases which deny a substantive right to an individual
based on characteristics such as race, religion, national origin and sex, 7 the
homosexual individual is left without constitutional remedy in the area of
equal protection.' 7 1 Since the decision of Bowers v. Hardwick, the individual
is also left without a right to privacy claim. Based on the broad Georgia
statute that the Supreme Court found to pass constitutional standards, we
may all be left without a right to privacy claim, if that claim is based on
adult consensual sexual activity unrelated to the traditional values of marriage, family and procreation.
172. Id. at 510. For an analysis of this issue, see Note, The Constitutionality
of Laws ForbiddingPrivate Homosexual Conduct, 72 Micr. L. REv. 1613 (1974).
173. 713 S.W.2d at 510.
174. Id.
175. 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
176. Id. at 511-12.
177. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979).
178. In the area of employment discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. This has been determined
specifically not to protect individuals on the basis of their sexual preference. See
Desantis v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
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